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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the ties between business and power in Russia and to analyse 
the features of what can be considered a conﬂ ictual relationship. Using the approaches of D. North, 
J. Wallis, B. Weingast, and J. Nye as a starting point, this article provides an overview of new business 
development in Russia and suggests that power is an important factor in the relationship between 
businesses and authorities in a transitional society. Drawing on both a theoretical and empirical analysis, 
it will be shown that ties between businesses and authorities have come to generate social distrust and 
negative attitudes towards both institutions in today’s Russia.
Keywords: transition society, business and authority, conﬂ ict management, political strategies, 
corruption.
Introduction
For researchers engaged in the study of the political and social conﬂ icts, the application of the 
conceptual and categorical apparatus of conﬂ ict studies to the examination of the relationship 
between businesses and authority in post-Soviet Russia is of a particular interest. Modern Western 
capitalism formed over the course of a long political struggle against the values of the medieval and 
feudal worlds, and it is the result of the long development of free competition between the authorities 
and the bourgeois community. Russian businesses emerged from the political will of the state and on 
the foundation of a destroyed state-based economy. This creates a special type of labour and capital, 
as well as businesses and authorities. The absence of free competition, which is not associated with an 
obvious apparatus-state protectionism, and a force or criminal ‘mode of production’ in many respects 
have its historical background. The opacity of the decision-making process inherent to the system of 
relations between businesses and the authorities makes it diﬃ  cult to identify the real nature of the 
conﬂ icts between them. Classical theories are unable to explain why fundamental social institutions 
do not survive in the transforming Russia (Gaddy & Ickes, 2002; Kordonskyi, 2007; Barsukova, 2009; 
Nureev & Latov, 2011; Bessonova, 2012; Kirdina, 2014) and why Western values and business ideals are 
not accepted by the masses (Reddaway & Glinski, 2001; Sorokin, 2002; Trenin, 2010). The latter in the 
Russian context acquire new forms that do not easily ﬁ t into any known examples. The relationship 
between the society, businesses and the authorities has a speciﬁ c structure. On the basis of general 
views, the elite tries to put forward concepts that describe in a new way the reasons for the structural 
change of business in Russia (Puﬀ er et al, 1998; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2003; Hellman et al, 2003; 
Yakovlev, 2006).
The classical theory of rent-seeking certainly has value for our research too. The category ‘rent-
seeking’ appeared in the works of Tullock (1967); Krueger (1974); Mueller (2008). Later it was developed 
by Samuels and Mercuro (1984), Tollison (1997), Buchanan and others (1980). Now this concept is one 
*  E-mail address of corresponding author: pinckevich.a@yandex.ru
Models and Strategies of Confl ict Interaction between Business
and Authorities in Transition Societies: the Case of Russia
6 Anna Pinkevich, Andrei Aleinikov & Igor Osipov
of the basic concepts in the political-economical analysis of any transition society (Heilman, 1998; 
Olson, 2000). The most interesting works for our analysis are those where the rent-seeking concept is 
used to study Russia (Shleifer & Treisman, 2000; Gaddy & Ickes, 2005).
Two authors from the current mainstream Acemoglu and Robinson (2012; 2013) argue that the 
theory of social conﬂ ict is the key theory today. From their point of view, the choice of economic 
institutions depends on those who have political power. The political processes determine in which 
economic situation and under which economic institutions people live. This theory is the most suitable 
in our analysis for its methodological basis. The identiﬁ cation and comparison of the positions, values, 
goals, problems, interests, and needs of the conﬂ icting sides are the essence of contemporary conﬂ ict 
analysis.
One can ﬁ nd two models of conﬂ ict between the authorities and businesses (Hellman et al, 2000). 
In the ﬁ rst case, state representatives get part of the proﬁ ts of economic enterprises by charging them 
a fee to enter the market. The business pays this bribe from its own proﬁ t to enter the market and, 
thus, they are a subject to the political power of state representatives.
In the second model, the business dictates its will to the representatives of the state and uses 
the political power in their own interests, in particular by limiting their competitors’ access to the 
market (Bichkova & Gel’man, 2010; Yakovlev, 2010). Thus, there is a conversion of the political power 
into an economic one and back. By limiting competition, the business involved gets super proﬁ ts, 
part of which is spent on bribing the government representatives. In this scenario, the business 
makes the oﬃ  cials express their interests. These concepts assume that one of the parties to the 
conﬂ ict are suﬀ ering in the arrangement. In the case of Russia, it is necessary to talk about how 
the interests of businesses and the authorities are combined. None of the conﬂ icts between them 
have ever questioned the overall political and economic regime or aﬀ ect the principles according to 
which the system is constructed. The Russian reality replaces the socialisation of businesses and their 
integration into social relations, the clan system, and corporate cohesion.
In this article, we will shed light on some aspects of this topic. Mostly, we are interested in the 
analytical problem, not in proving the existence of conﬂ ict between the authorities and businesses 
as such, but rather in describing the forms of its development, the mechanisms, and the social 
consequences of its resolution. At the same time, we have to classify these conﬂ icts, starting with the 
forms they acquire due to diﬀ erences in the axis of ‘path dependence’, and the peculiarities of their 
political courses, which were directed by the most powerful political ﬁ gures in Russia (Berger, 1981; 
Arthur, 1984; North, 1990; Margolis & Liebowitz, 1998; Hedlund, 2005). In general, there are several 
questions to answer at once. What determines the institutional development of the conﬂ icts between 
Russian businesses and the state? What are the behavioural strategies of businesses in conﬂ icts 
with the state under the conditions of the special institutional environment in Russia? What does 
the current system of conﬂ ict relations resemble to the greatest degree: patronage, force conﬂ ict, 
symbiosis, ‘network oligarchy?’ Or should we talk about a quirky mix of diﬀ erent models? The main 
hypothesis of the article is that the post-soviet Russian transformation model of conﬂ ict resolution 
deals with the removal of a ‘foreign’ actor from participating in the distribution of resources with the 
help of political and economic competition restrictions.
Concepts of studying confl ict interaction between businesses and the authorities 
in Russia
Studying conﬂ icts between businesses and the state in Russia allows for the involvement of several 
conceptual approaches. Among them, the Tilly approach, which analyses the development of 
democracy; the approaches of North, Wallis, and Weingast to social orders of the ‘natural state’, 
‘limited access order’, ‘open access orders’; Nye’s concept of diﬀ erent forms of power, as well as the 
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fashionable concept of ‘new Russian feudalism’, focusing on the informal structures of patronage 
and clientelism (Tilly, 2007). Each of these concepts oﬀ ers its view on the processes of managing and 
settling the conﬂ icts. The use of the entire variety of existing approaches and methods while analysing 
the Russian business/state conﬂ ict model is presumed to be useful.
Nye distinguishes three forms of power in relation to politics and the practice of international 
relations: hard power (the use of force or threat of its use; transformation of the market into a tool 
of policy), soft power (the use of propaganda and persuasion), and smart power (the development 
of strategies to increase the eﬀ ectiveness of both hard and soft power) (Nye, 2004). The concept 
of soft power is interesting not only for the study of external resources of the authority, but also 
for the discursive analysis of the communication tools in the conﬂ ict space. Despite the multi-
layered semantic structure of the concept of soft power and a variety of options for its patterns 
of interpretation, the fact of its rapid popularity indicates the implemented cognitive force for the 
technological analysis of conﬂ ict management. Hard power is associated with the external coercion 
of the conﬂ ict parties. Subjectively, it is taken as a power of the external forces that subjugates the 
will of the party of the conﬂ ict. Unlike hard power, soft power is not perceived by the parties of the 
conﬂ ict as a force that acts from the outside. Soft power is a power that is implemented in the form of 
communicative inﬂ uence in the conﬂ ict, is dictated by the authority and is perceived by the recipient 
as a free and voluntary choice. A combination of the traditional power sources with communicative 
methodologies and soft power practices can provide mobility and ﬂ exibility to modern institutions 
in conﬂ ict resolution. Hard power is the ability to practice coercion, due to superiority in either 
resources or status. In contrast with a ‘hard’ way of inﬂ uence, soft power is the ability to obtain 
the desired based on the voluntary participation of the conﬂ ict parties in the process of conﬂ ict 
resolution, rather than coercion, fraud or bribery.
From the positions of the concept of soft power, there are diﬀ erent types of conﬂ ict styles in a 
society. Its selection is primarily connected with the system of institutionalisation of the conﬂ ict. 
The ﬁ rst type, avoiding acute outbreaks, provides “both sides of the urgent opportunity for direct 
expression of the contradictory requirements,. . . .to eliminate the source of discontent,. . . .to tackle 
the root causes of the internal divisions and to restore social cohesion” (Coser, 1991, p. 23). This style 
uses the concept of the American political philosopher Young and can be called a ‘communicative 
democracy’ (Young, 1993; Young, 2000). It distinguishes a negotiating democracy and a communicative 
democracy. In the negotiating democracy, communication is based on a strictly argumentative 
discussion. A communicative democracy seeks to go beyond the purely argumentative discourse. 
Here, all communicative resources allow one social group to express their position and their social 
experience is important. This communicative potential, whether it is hidden, deformed, or, on the 
contrary, has an open form, determines, in our interpretation, the conﬂ icting styles of the society. 
An opposite style of the ‘communicative gap’ is connected with the suppression of conﬂ icts, 
which is ensured by the force and by the intervention of the authorities. This option of conﬂ ict 
resolution could mark the start of a spiral of social destruction and a complete disintegration of the 
society. According to Bauman, society is doomed to extinction and a complete collapse of the social-
normative system if the death of traditional institutions is not compensated by new institutes of 
informal communication and social control (Bauman, 2001). Darendorf compared this type of conﬂ ict 
to a malignancy, claiming that those who fail to regulate conﬂ icts by their recognition create their 
own problem (Darendorf, 1969, p. 140).
Iwasaki distinguishes three types of interaction models between the state and businesses: an 
‘order state’, a ‘punish state’, and a ‘rescue state’ (Iwasaki, 2003).
In the ‘order state’, business structures are under strict centralised control and mass privatisation 
is not carried out (so it is doubtful whether there are special models of interaction between the state 
and businesses). Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can serve as examples of such countries. 
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A ‘punish state’ is limited to the maintenance of market institutions and does not interfere in 
the mechanisms of corporation management; also, it shall not take measures to prevent bankruptcy, 
which is typical for the Baltic countries. 
And, ﬁ nally, a ‘rescue state’, which grants the economic entities a possibility to take decisions 
independently, but retains the right to interfere in a certain situations, and to prevent bankruptcy of 
the enterprises. The state intervention is not limited by clear regulations and institutions and leaves a 
great scope for corruption and lobbying.
Also, the work of Bichkova and Gelman, the Russian researchers who proposed the original 
typology of relations between economic and political ﬁ gures should be noted. They identiﬁ ed the 
following types of relations: ‘predatory state’, ‘rent-seeking’, ‘state capture’, ‘laissez-faire’, and 
‘mutual hostages’ (Bichkova & Gel’man, 2010).
In the ‘predatory state’, bodies of the state authorities lose their motives for constructive 
cooperation with businesses. The authorities control the main economic resources, autocratically 
implement key decisions, and carry out a policy of economic development without the participation 
of the business groups. Business structures are fragmented and cannot resist them.
In ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘state capture’ types, there are strong business structures that have signiﬁ cant 
inﬂ uence on the political decisions of the state power bodies.
‘Laissez-faire’ is characterised by a mutual weakness of the business structures and the authority, 
not allowing the dominance of any party.
‘Mutual hostages’ — the business and the authority have an equal force and seek for a common 
ground in terms of interests, coexisting with each other.
There are several doorstep conditions in current day Russia for a transition from the system of 
limited access to the system of open access, and they were formulated in the last works of North and 
his co-authors (2006):
1. rule of law for the elites; 
2. perpetual forms of organisation for the elites (including the state); 
3. political control of the military. 
An analysis of the research precepts allows to distinguish the three main aspects of modelling an 
interaction between businesses and the authorities based on the following set of classiﬁ cation criteria: 
the type of organisational design of the business and the institutionalisation degree of its relations 
with the authorities; the method and the degree of legitimisation of a business in the society; the 
structure and the balance of relations between businesses, authorities, and society. According to the 
given attributes, the following modes of operation for the conﬂ icting relations between businesses 
and the authorities can be pointed out: ‘prescriptive’, ‘functional’, and ‘communicative’.
A ‘prescriptive’ regime — power takes the form of domination, to ensure that the business carries 
out orders and directives (this space is often identiﬁ ed with cash means, resources and enabling 
the power community to realise its own will). For the prescriptive regime, an amorphous nature 
of businesses as political subjects that have an impact on policy making is typical. The strategic 
management of property is executed by dominant ﬁ gures — the authority and an ideological 
legitimisation of the ‘equal distance’ of the business is carried out through the strict manipulative 
eﬀ ect of the media.
Within the ‘functional’ regime, the authority appears as an ability to implement the function of 
public control over businesses as a socio-political factor with a certain relationship. In the functional 
regime, the business is partly autonomous; a system of ‘feedings’ is developed. In the competitive 
struggle, between business entities the administrative methods prevail, property rights are blurred by 
the power, i.e. the regulatory institutions, and in the mechanisms of redistribution power resources 
based on the legal norms are dominated.
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The ‘communicative’ regime implies that the authorities interact with businesses through 
communication that functions according to a set of rules that are understandable to both sides. Within 
this format, business entities are independent from the authorities, inﬂ uencing policy development 
through formal mechanisms for lobbying and interacting with each other, according to the laws 
of market competition. Property rights are well deﬁ ned and ﬁ xed, and redistribution processes are 
dominated by economic and legal mechanisms. 
The poor conditions of doing business in Russia have been the subject of numerous research 
studies for a long time. An overview of the recent works is available in the article by Ledeneva, in which 
she emphasizes that “Essential for our understanding of the operation of Putin’s system today are his 
ﬁ ndings of an ambiguity around such entrepreneurial practices and a shifting boundary between legal 
and illegal economic activities” (Ledeneva, 2012).
As a basis of the initial conceptual framework of our research, we can mention a well-developed 
and approved concept by Frye and Shleifer (1997) — the ‘Invisible, Helping, and Grabbing Hand’ (see 
Table 1).
It should be noted that in practice there is always a combination of several kinds of these models 
and concepts; in other words, it would be pertinent to speak about the predominance of one model or 
concept over another in the interaction between businesses and the authorities.
The main features of the relationship between businesses and the authorities in 
Russia
In the conditions of the system conﬂ ict in the society in Russia, the institutions that ensure the state 
monopoly of violence were the only organised power of socio-political order in the country. Providing 
redistribution of property, ﬁ nancial and administrative resources, the institutions of violence have 
become a substitute for the planned regulation of the economy losing its functional character and 
becoming a part of the political power.
The behaviour of two subjects in the conﬂ ict between business and the authorities is dictated only 
by their own interests. The businesses always aim at maximizing the satisfaction of their interests 
and are able to achieve it under certain conditions. The authorities have advantages compared to 
businesses and they use them in the most eﬀ ective manner, promoting further strengthening of 
power. The presence of the strategic component in the conﬂ ict means that both the business and the 
authority use ‘structural distortion’ and mutually promote its reproduction, thus, reinforcing their 
positions in the future. 
Table 1: The concept of ‘invisible, helping, and grabbing hand’
Legal environment Regulatory environment
Invisible hand
Government is not above law and uses 
power to supply minimal public goods. 
Courts enforce contracts.
Government follows rules. Regulation is 
minimal. Little corruption.
Helping hand
Government is above law, but uses 
power to help business.
State oﬃ  cials enforce contracts.
Government aggressively regulates to 
promote some businesses. Organised 
corruption.
Grabbing hand
Government is above law and uses power 
to extract rents. The legal system does not 
work. Maﬁ a replaces state as enforcer.
Predatory regulations.
Disorganised corruption.
Source: Frye & Shleifer (1997)
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Material capabilities and the legitimacy of the political elite depend on the investment solutions 
of businesses, allowing them to sometimes exert an indirect impact on politics. The government can 
prohibit some business activities, but may not order to perform its functions. If the government is 
pursuing a policy that seriously infringes the interests of business and signiﬁ cantly limits its autonomy, 
then, as a rule, this leads to an ‘investment strike’ and an outﬂ ow of capital.
The export of capital is, in particular, the reaction of entrepreneurs aimed at protecting and 
rescuing their proﬁ t. A signiﬁ cant decline in investment leads to negative social consequences: it 
reduces support for the regime, undermining the legitimacy of the political elite. The narrowing of 
the tax base leads to a reduction of material and political opportunities of the state, a refusal of 
the realisation of its social obligations. Thus, a policy that signiﬁ cantly restricts business interests 
may, like a boomerang, hit its initiator, the ruling regime, undermining material opportunities and 
legitimacy and increasing the likelihood of acute forms of political conﬂ icts.
The Russian case is speciﬁ c, according to the Russian researcher Akhiezer, in that the power is 
in constant fear of the fact that conﬂ icts will cause uncontrollable destabilisation and absorb the 
country (Il’yin et al, 1996). This danger is suppressed by the invasion of the state in conﬂ icts at lower 
levels and by the creation of special bodies for control and repression. Russian society is not yet in a 
position to turn a lot of conﬂ ict into a stimulus for the development of a dialogue. The participants of 
the conﬂ ict, in turn, appear to use the state against each other in the conﬂ ict, thereby corrupting the 
conﬂ ict. The Russian authorities are overburdened with unmanageable conﬂ icts. They do not solve and 
cannot cope with conﬂ icts, always busy with its non-admission into politics. The imitation of conﬂ ict 
management institutions in Russia allows the ruling elite to maintain the regime, simultaneously 
increasing the degradation of the society and the authority.
Thus, the state is an organising element of institutional structures or an institutional environment 
for Russian business. In this regard, it is necessary to describe the phenomenon of ‘power-property’, 
which describes the situation when power and dominance, access to the resources, are not based on 
private property as such, but on a high position in the traditional hierarchy and on prestige (Service, 
1975; Fried, 1967; Nureev, 2009).
It is the dominance of the institute of power-property in many ways that is the most important 
characteristic of the Russian political and economic system. This institute is explicitly ineﬀ ective 
compared to public, private, or individualised property. Often the causes of such development could 
be found in a socio-cultural particularity of a country, which seizes a complete private property market 
system. However, it is more correct to talk about the kind of societal development in which the state 
(the authority) plays a central role in the shaping of the economic, political, and social relations. 
Power-property is an order in which the political leadership gives the inalienable right to dispose of 
the property and the property organically implies an existence of political authority. The welfare of the 
political elite depends on their place and position in the hierarchy of state power, and not on inherited 
and acquired property. Thus, in Russia there is a conﬂ ict not just of power and property, but of two 
institutional systems of ownership: ‘power-property’ and private property. The particularity of this 
conﬂ ict is that the elements of one system are present in the structure of the other. While deriving 
private beneﬁ ts in the form of control over the state property by the oﬃ  cials is typical for many 
political regimes, then deriving an oﬃ  cial’s beneﬁ ts in the form of control over a private business is 
the hallmark of Russia.
The role of the Russian state has always gone beyond the regulation of terms and conditions of 
doing business. The main goal was always the regulation of access to the scarce resources. The system 
task of transforming the territorial and social space into the space of a controlled and managed power 
required providing the funds to respond to events threatening Russian statehood. Hence, a speciﬁ c 
form of a ‘state-warehouse’ is arising. This concept can be seen as a way of observing and describing 
Russian society, as the resource-distribution ‘lens’ of Russian politics, which characterises the inability 
of the population to dispose of the resources independently and an attitude of the entrepreneurs 
towards the power not only as the manager, but as the ‘great Master’.
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In this system of coordinates, everything is deﬁ ned by the ‘patron-client’ relationship, informal 
rules and laws are more important than the formal ones, and a branched extensive network of 
acquaintances, including both entrepreneurs and politicians, penetrates all formal institutions, being 
the most powerful collective ﬁ gures. The main strategy for domination in business and criterium 
for successful entrepreneurship in Russia is a takeover of others’ property, not its creation and 
eﬀ ective management. For their businesses to be successful, the entrepreneurs in Russia ﬁ rst have 
to be able to get along with the authorities, to establish contacts with the oﬃ  cials, instead of having 
a good understanding of strategic marketing and management. The entrepreneur, who controls a 
considerable material and ﬁ nancial resources, realises that the future of his business directly depends 
on good relations with the current government. He understands that even an unbiased coverage of 
the actions of the opposition of own media aﬀ ects the relationship. The public example of the ‘Yukos 
aﬀ air’ has forced the bulk of Russian entrepreneurs to abandon the idea that they can challenge the 
system without risking being expelled from the country and losing their wealth.
Analysing the conﬂ icts of the state and business, it is necessary to dwell on the concept of ‘new 
Russian feudalism’. It is presented in the research work of Shlapentokh in the most comprehensive 
manner. Following the traditions of universalism in the analysis of conﬂ icts in the society, he argues 
that
The liberal and authoritarian (or in some cases totalitarian) models, in their various forms, have failed 
to fully explain the social, political, and economic changes in the post-Soviet countries. While these two 
models remain relevant for the analysis of Russian society, they need to be used in a conjunction with a 
third model, the feudal model, which on its own is probably able to describe more elements of the post-
Soviet society than the other two. (Shlapentokh, 2007, pp. 183-184)
Drawing a parallel between the contemporary Russian political and social system and early 
European feudalism, Shlapentokh notes that for Russia, which is, due to the various conﬂ icts, not 
capable of enforcing law and order, the following features are characteristic:
1. the boundaries between public and private spheres are either blurred or they do not exist; 
2. power and property are so intertwined that it is often impossible to separate them from each 
other;
3. like medieval barons, Russian bureaucrats at all levels of the hierarchy use their political power to 
control property, while the rich exchange money for power to control political decisions; 
4. personal relations play a greater role than the networks based on the formal positions of people in 
the political, social, and economic structures; 
5. the most powerful people in the country are not elected public ﬁ gures, but close friends of the 
President.
Another author who writes about Russian neo-feudalism is Inozemtsev. There is one basic 
principle in the system of Russia’s so-called neo-feudalism — “It is much easier for subjects to solve 
their problems individually than to challenge national institutions collectively” (Inozemtsev, 2011). In 
this case, corruption is the principle of the normal functioning of the system in the situation of any 
generally accepted alternative.
Informal relations and forms of economic activities take place in many transition societies, also 
in Russia. Special contributions to the investigation of the role of informal economic relations were 
made by several authors (Ledeneva, 1998; Caldwell, 2004; Grabiner, 2000; Wallace & Latcheva, 2006; 
Polese & Rodgers, 2011, Morris & Polese, 2014). They argue that informal relations are a fundamental 
part of economic relations in the former Soviet Union. 
The role of informal and personal relations in economics and politics gives grounds to characterise 
the Russian political and economic system as ‘crony capitalism’. In our opinion, its main features are: 
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1. systems of conﬂ icts between closed groups of businessmen and politicians, oﬃ  cials of law 
enforcement bodies, united by common business interests and informal relationships.
2. informal norms and rules of behaviour in a conﬂ ict play a greater role than formal laws, and the 
violation of conduct is punished much more severely than of laws;
3. regulation of conﬂ icts in the business sphere is put into eﬀ ect using methods of force (e.g. 
inspections by the controlling authorities, criminal cases, refusals to grant licenses); unconditional 
loyalty to the group and hostility toward non-members.
The ‘crony capitalism’ in Russia is constructed mainly around the export of mineral resources 
(oil, gas, ferrous, and non-ferrous metals) and control over energy and the state budget. According to 
calculations made by Russian economists, 84% of the largest companies are engaged in the extraction 
of mineral resources and processing of raw materials. Only eight of the largest companies (16%) 
are employed in the other industries, ﬁ ve of whom produce cars that are not competitive on the 
international markets and are kept aﬂ oat only due to the high import duties and other forms of state 
protectionism (Braguinsky & Yavlinsky, 2000). Control of these sectors of the economy is also a source 
of activities for the political organizations and mass media. 
Cronyism is a way of settling private and social conﬂ icts, carried out not in accordance with the 
formal rules and laws, but with informal norms. Within the ‘clan conﬂ icts’, the decisions made can 
both conform to the law in form and contradict it.
Consider the situation in Russia today in terms of given threshold conditions. So, according to 
a recent study, the subjects of 80% of criminal cases brought to court are unemployed. Every third 
person gets real imprisonment and is sent to prison. In contrast, Russian judges are much more 
tolerant of civil servants and only 11.8% of all convicted oﬃ  cials are sentenced to real punishment. 
The author of the research, one of the most famous Russian contemporary sociologists Volkov, came 
to the conclusion that status slopes are clearly expressed in the Russian courts, and the conﬂ ict 
between bureaucracy and the business is reﬂ ected in the sphere of criminal justice. Criminal justice in 
Russia works particularly against marginalised elements and representatives of business. Unemployed 
persons (32.8%) are imprisoned, while the share of imprisoned civil servants is 11.8% and the share of 
top-managers is 13,8%, respectively. The groups that belong to the state have strong privileges in the 
courts. The chances of acquittal on all counts among employees of law enforcement is 18% higher in 
case of marginal and 5% higher in case of serious crimes. An average sentence handed to state oﬃ  cials 
is 4 years, while for entrepreneurs it is 4.7 years, and for the top managers 4.6 years. A real prison 
term is handed to civil servants half as often than to all other defendants combined. The high-status 
group of entrepreneurs usually accused of fraud is discriminated and is given on average three to four 
months longer than the representatives of other social groups for the same oﬀ ense (Volkov, 2013).
The power resource is an important factor in relations between businesses and the authorities. 
The existence of a power resource still has a serious impact on the resolution of disputes between 
the economic agents. The rights and privileges of the elite groups depend on their position in the 
dominant coalition. The loss of political inﬂ uence leads not only to the deprivation of access to 
distributed resources, while loss of property sometimes leads to imprisonment. The real elite factions 
are not institutionalised. The attempts of business to institutionalise its inﬂ uence can be dangerous, 
as exempliﬁ ed by the fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
The power, interfering in almost all of the conﬂ ict institutions, breaks a complex relationship 
between the actors in the conﬂ ict, suppressing sources of self-development. Simultaneously, the 
social ﬁ eld of the conﬂ icts, with its complex forms of conﬂ ict regulation, is reduced to the aggregation 
of the particular conﬂ ict with its various and often closed and informal rules of settlement. Such 
actions often cause new conﬂ icts and sometimes even result in fatal consequences for the main 
ﬁ gures. The political signiﬁ cance of business is determined neither by the production or perfectness 
of its achievements, nor by the participation in the representation of values of the society, but by 
Models and Strategies of Conﬂ ict Interaction between Business and Authorities in Transition Societies: 
the Case of Russia
13
the aﬃ  liation with one or another group of oﬃ  cials. Having the most important strategic potential, 
business in Russia either has no political ambitions or simulates having them, yet often is directly 
included in the structures of power.
It is important to note that the bulk of Russia’s small and medium businesses are operating in the 
real sector of the economy and oriented mainly towards the satisfaction of the needs of the population, 
thus, they were practically eliminated from the system in terms of a relationship with the authority. 
Property rights in such circumstances were guaranteed only to the owners of the assets that were in 
close personal relations with government oﬃ  cials, who received a share of income in the business 
structures, whose stability they provided. An orientation towards the external commodity consumer 
and not towards the products, services, and goods necessary for the society in everyday life refers 
to the objective interest of the authority in a weak and subordinate business. The evolution of the 
relationship between business and the authorities in Russia resulted in obtaining the share of rents by 
a small number of the power structures at the expense of manual management and mutual control, 
based on the principle of ‘mutual hostages’. Such a system could only result in the concentration 
of property, a hypertrophied strengthening of the informal mechanisms of coordination of business 
and government interests, which reduces the likelihood of the market reforms succeeding and the 
economic policy being eﬀ ective.
Business and society in current Russia
Ties between businesses and the authorities cause social distrust and negative attitudes in Russia. 
A huge gap in income gives rise to social tension. Business in Russia is organised as a conversion of 
the ﬁ nancial resources obtained from the budget, with its further investment into foreign assets. 
Russian businesses hold the leading position in the world in purchasing real estate in European 
capitals (according to some estimates, the share of Russians among the buyers of elite housing on 
the French Riviera is 12%). Also, a business in Russia represents the conversion of budget resources 
into the state’s resources, a ruling status, civil oﬃ  ces, access to the distribution of other resources, 
participation in the political administration of the state. An informal large-scale system of converting 
resources of diﬀ erent types was formed in Russia (see Table 2). Thus, the ‘elite’ Russian stratum of 
society is fragmented into groups that are involved in the ‘conﬂ ict of access’ to the resources and super 
proﬁ table businesses. They are focused on the creation of raw material and communication hyper-
monopolies, which constitute the most readily available technology for control by the authorities.
Table 2: System of resources conversion in Russia
Diﬀ erent types 
of resources
Administrative and 
political
Economical Power resource
Administrative 
and political
X
Nomenclature entrepreneur-
ship, creation of hothouse 
conditions for their busi-
nesses and obstacle for 
competitors, kickbacks
Organisation of force acts 
by law enforcement oﬃ  cials 
against the competitors
Economical Bribes, buying oﬃ  ces X
Payment of force acts against 
the competitors
Power
resource
Power seizure of oﬃ  ces, 
assassinations of oﬃ  cials
Power enterprise, power 
seizure of assets, contract 
killings of businessmen
X
Source: Kosals (2006)
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An analytical report by the Institute of Sociology of the RAS records that about 70% of respondents 
believe that the purpose of transforming the Russian economy was not in overcoming the economic 
crisis, but in the interests of both the reformers and the public groups behind them, aspiring towards 
the repartition of the former socialist property in their favour (Institute of Sociology of the RAS, 2011). 
The true purpose of the reforms was the seizure of power by the second level of the Soviet elite and 
the redistribution of public property in their favour. This is the opinion of 69% of the respondents.
Another fact on the development of the Russian economy deals with the level and quality of life in 
Russia. According to data cited by Gilinskiy, 13.4% of the population in Russia live in destitution with 
income below $110 per month. Extreme poverty with income from $110 to $250 aﬀ ects 27.8% of the 
population (Gilinskii, 2011). 38.8% of the population live in poverty, with income from $250 to $560. 
If the poor has its rich, then it is the 10.9% of the Russians with incomes from $560 to $830. When 
it comes to the level of middle-class income, 7.3% of population has income rates of $830 to $1700. 
The share of wealthy citizens with income from $1,700 to $2,500 amounts to 1.1%. So in summary: 
41.2% of the population are beggars, 49.7% are poor (beggars and poor combined — 90.9%), 8.4% are 
wealthy and, obviously, 0.7% are rich. In comparison — the income of a board member of the state-
owned monopoly Gazprom is $193,000 per month (excluding annual and other bonuses). The salary 
of the highest oﬃ  cials in Russia (for example, the heads of law enforcement institutions) exceeds 
10.2 — 21.3 times the average income of the country. In the UK, the ﬁ gure is 6.4 times, in Germany — 
7.1 times, in the United States — 5.17 times, in Norway — 3.7, in France — 4.68. The research work of 
Peters shows that such gaps between the average salaries of citizens and their high-ranking rulers 
are a characteristic of the most backward countries in Africa and the authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America (Peters, 2009).
The gap is huge and can result in a conﬂ ict. 73% of respondents believe that over the past ten years 
the gap between the rich and the poor has increased; 52% believe that among the country’s leadership 
there are more thieves and the level of corruption is worse than in the 1990s (Shevcova, 2011). 
Guriev estimates that 30 Russian oligarchs employ 42% of the Russian population, while the Federal 
government in the same category of production — only 15% (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005). According to 
the evaluation of Ruthland, about 20 private companies are controlled by only 37 businessmen and 
produce almost a third of Russia’s GDP (Ruthland, 2008, p. 1055). According to other estimations, in 
Russia 1 per cent of the richest people get 40% of the total national income. In comparison: even in the 
United States, the same 1 per cent of the richest get only 8% of all revenues (Shkaratan, 2011). 
Strictly speaking, the polarisation in Russia of the very rich and powerful minority, which is 
‘included in the distribution of the pie’, and the very poor and powerless majority of the ‘excluded’, 
using the terminology of Bauman ‘a wasted life’, not needed for the modern society creates fertile 
ground for the populist redistribution policy (Bauman, 2004). This again creates a system conﬂ ict of at 
least two subcultures, preserving the basic features of the Russian living conditions. Only 2 per cent of 
the population with extremely high incomes can be attributed to the ﬁ rst group (‘the included’) and 
a class that ‘serves’ them (a generalised middle class) comprises about 20% of the Russian families. 
They depend largely on the state and are less likely to rely on civil society. We must remember that the 
modern Russian society is characterised by a discrete structure; a discontinuity of the coordination 
of cooperation and conﬂ ict; social-cultural, existential and ethnic alienations between the upper and 
lower ranks of the society. The Russian conﬂ icts are of a system-paralysing character and so complex 
that the syndrome of the ‘Gordian knot’ occurs, which is easier to cut than to untangle.
Russia has vertical cliques, organised on patron-client relations, which control the key industries 
of the economy and the key institutions. A system of use of the institutional resources of violence 
‘removes’ the conﬂ ict, forcing other social groups to recognise the narrow partisan or separate 
institutional, departmental, and even corporate interests as the state and national interests ‘of the 
whole’.
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We can assume that the strengthening of the power vertical axis has led to the system of acute 
conﬂ ict in the form of an allocation of the resources between public corporations, ministries, regions 
and private businesses, controlled by the members of the ruling coalition. Thus, the more unevenly 
scarce resources are distributed in the system, the deeper the conﬂ ict of interests between the 
dominant and subordinate segments of the system. The deep awareness of the disadvantaged groups 
about their interests leads to the question of legal distribution and the justice of the currently existing 
forms of distributing scarce resources. The more subordinate groups are aware of their interests and 
their violation, the more likely it is that they will have to join together in an open conﬂ ict with the 
dominant groups in the system. The social energy is aggravated in antagonistic conﬂ icts in the areas 
of symbolic wars, social networks and in everyday life.
Conclusions 
The speciﬁ c design of the conﬂ icts between the Russian businesses and the authorities contains 
a signiﬁ cantly greater extent of the transformational rent, an acute struggle for its capture, and a 
signiﬁ cant role of the federal centre in the distribution of rent.
The speciﬁ c features of the Russian model of conﬂ ict between businesses and the authorities 
include:
1. conﬂ icts between the authorities and businesses are social constructions in which demand 
on ‘bad’ conﬂ ict resolution institutes is formed by the authorities and these institutes have no 
positive eﬀ ect;
2. the concentration of power and property, as well as social inequality reduces the interest of the 
rich and powerful economic players in having eﬀ ective state institutes;
3. the authority stimulates distrust between market players towards each other. In addition, the 
least eﬃ  cient Russian corporations are the most inﬂ uential lobbying groups. These companies 
have become a major source of budget income. Politicians, on the other hand, can use this non-
eﬀ ective conﬂ ict resolution as an instrument for power saving;
4. empirical data conﬁ rms that Russian business strategies are orientated towards using relations 
with the state as a competitive advantage but not to increase their income.
The techniques used in the relations between businesses and the authorities to provoke new 
conﬂ icts are as follows: 
1. receiving state orders, subsidies that violate the terms of competition, the use of governmental 
pressure when selecting suppliers or customers;
2. use of public resources (ﬁ nancial, power, intellectual, judicial) for the development of an ‘equally 
closed’ business, protectionism, and the creation of artiﬁ cial monopolies;
3. granting of tax or other privileges;
4. selective application of the law in violation of economic legislation, an artiﬁ cial bankruptcy for the 
redistribution of property;
5. insider information to support of upcoming innovations, including the proactive ones; 
6. the elimination of competitors using law enforcement agencies.
Both the state and businesses were not ready for the establishment of democratic procedures, 
political, and legal conditions protecting them from mutual ‘seizures’. The businesses began to use 
power as an element of design of competitive advantages, including the use of state resources for the 
impairment or economic destruction of the competitors. A compromise and a criminalisation of the 
rules of economic and political existence are attributed to the emergence of the Russian business and 
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constitute a common problem of the post-Communist development. The lack of moral legitimacy in 
Russian business leads to the interpretation of a business as an ‘activity for making money’ by any 
means, including immoral and non-market ones.
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